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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4519
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante (procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no CVG can meet all three concepts. We apply our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.
Schlagwörter: 
United Nations Security Council
United Nations
voting power
councils
square-root rule
equity
JEL: 
D72
D71
C71
C63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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