Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89680
Authors: 
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4519
Abstract: 
We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante (procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no CVG can meet all three concepts. We apply our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.
Subjects: 
United Nations Security Council
United Nations
voting power
councils
square-root rule
equity
JEL: 
D72
D71
C71
C63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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