Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89584
Authors: 
Chand, A. K. S.
Currarini, Sergio
Ursino, Giovanni
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 77.2013
Abstract: 
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium behavior, making it easier to sustain truth-telling.
Subjects: 
Cheap Talk
Multiple Senders
Correlation
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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