Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89288
Authors: 
Marengo, Luigi
Pirino, Davide
Settepanella, Simona
Takemura, Akimichi
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2012/12
Abstract: 
Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability to reach a final decision. We also better qualify the degree of manipulability of such a final decision, showing that it is independent not only from the agenda, but also from the initial condition. Therefore we show that the Marengo and Settepanella (2010) model has nice properties of decidability and can be fruitfully used both for normative and positive analyzes of collective choices among complex interdependent elements.
Subjects: 
social rule
object
optimum
probability
tournament
JEL: 
D03
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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