Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89172
Authors: 
Olivera, Mauricio
Pachon, Monica
Perry, Guillermo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-181
Abstract: 
This paper explores the characteristics of the political economy process that conditioned the scope and success of the combination of fiscal reforms before and after Colombia’s 1991 constitutional reforms. Using formal analysis of reforms and interviews with actors, reforms in taxation, decentralization, the budgetary process and pensions are examined in times of political crisis, economic crisis, and economic boom. The results generally confirm the hypothesis that increased political fragmentation and limited unilateral executive power after the 1991 reforms restricted the extent of reforms, particularly in tax law. Nonetheless, the enactment of piecemeal reforms was encouraged by crisis conditions.
Subjects: 
Policymaking process
Political economy
Structural reform
Colombia
JEL: 
H20
H71
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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