Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89147
Authors: 
Caruso, German
Scartascini, Carlos
Tommasi, Mariano
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-237
Abstract: 
The understanding of the economic effect of formal institutional rules has progressed substantially in recent decades. These formal analyses have tended to take for granted that institutional arenas such as Congress are the places where decision-making takes place. That is a good approximation in some cases (such as many developed countries today) but not in others. If countries differ in how institutionalized their policymaking is, it is possible that the impact of formal political rules on policy outcomes might depend on that. This paper explores that hypothesis and finds that some important claims regarding the impact of constitutions on policy outcomes do not hold for countries in which institutionalization is low. The findings suggest the need to develop a broader class of policymaking models in which the degree to which decision-making follows 'the rules' is also endogenized.
JEL: 
D72
D73
D78
H20
H60
H62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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