Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89138
Authors: 
Melo, Marcus
Pereira, Carlos
Souza, Saulo
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-117
Abstract: 
This project examines fiscal reforms in Brazil since the 1990s, particularly in taxation, budgeting, and fiscal federalism. While recentralizing fiscal authority and massively expanding the extractive capacity of the state, policymakers chose not to revamp an inefficient tax system that has nonetheless proven capable of generating high levels of revenue. In budgeting, the economic crises of the mid-1990s prompted the government to rein in subnational fiscal imbalances but discouraged policymakers from introducing major changes in the tax system. As the executive derives utility from fiscal stability and inflation control because of electoral incentives and credibility gains in international markets, reform initiatives can generate political benefits for incumbent politicians. The paper finally argues that the AchillesÂ’ heel of the sustainability of the Fiscal Responsibility Law is its enforcement technology: the Tribunais de Contas.
Subjects: 
Fiscal responsibility laws
Fiscal federalism
Brazil
Political institutions
JEL: 
H3
H77
H83
H71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
897.72 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.