Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88964
Authors: 
Miller, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-248
Abstract: 
The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.
JEL: 
D72
D31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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