Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88908 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 107
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the total pie of industry profits. Moreover, we apply a bargaining concept on the supply side to analyze how profit is split between retailers and manufacturers. Estimates show that bargaining power can be explained by several decision variables for retailers and manufacturers. Options for both indicate that any analysis of bargaining power has to consider a dynamic view on the relevant parameters.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining Power
Buyer Power
Antitrust
Discrete Choice
Demand Estimation
JEL: 
L1
L4
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-106-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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