Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88716
Authors: 
Lambert, Claudia
Noth, Felix
Schüwer, Ulrich
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper Series 38
Abstract: 
This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
Subjects: 
financial crisis
deposit insurance
bank regulation
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
455.92 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.