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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Research Papers in Economics No. 4/13
Verlag: 
Universität Trier, Fachbereich IV – Volkswirtschaftslehre, Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Using representative data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show that employees in establishments with active owners are less likely to introduce a works council. Moreover, we show that, in case of an introduction, the new works council is less likely to survive if active owners are present. Our findings conform to the hypothesis that active owners oppose codetermination because it reduces the utility they gain from being the ultimate bosses within the establishment.
Schlagwörter: 
Active Owner
Works Council Introduction
Works Council Dissolution
Liability of Newness
Employer Resistance to Change
JEL: 
J50
J53
J54
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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