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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
24th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Technology, Investment and Uncertainty", Florence, Italy, 20th-23rd October, 2013
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.
Schlagwörter: 
spectrum licensing
policy instruments, market entry
JEL: 
D82
L51
L96
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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