Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/88462
Authors: 
Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
24th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunication Society, Florence, Italy, 20-23 October 2013
Abstract: 
Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.
Subjects: 
combinatorial clock auction
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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