Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88431 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UFZ Discussion Paper No. 18/2013
Verlag: 
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung (UFZ), Leipzig
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollu-tion problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less 'green' than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emis-sions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmen-tal damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic delegation
global pollution problems
self-protection
non-cooperative behaviour
JEL: 
C72
D72
H41
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
264.66 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.