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Autoren: 
Feld, Lars P.
Schnellenbach, Jan
Datum: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik No. 13/6
Zusammenfassung: 
We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort.
Schlagwörter: 
Redistribution
Formal Institutions
Fiscal Decentralization
Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes
Electoral Systems
JEL: 
D31
H22
H11
H50
I38
P50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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