Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88094 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 118
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
In a two-tier oligopoly, where the downstream firms are locked in pair-wise exclusive relationships with their upstream input suppliers, the equilibrium mode of competition in the downstream market is endogenously determined as a renegotiation-proof contract signed between each downstream firm and its exclusive upstream input supplier. We find that the upstream-downstream exclusive relationships credibly sustain the Cournot (Bertrand) mode of competition in the downstream market, when the goods are substitutes (complements). In contrast to previous studies, this result holds irrespectively of the degree of product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firm, over the pairspecific input price.
Schlagwörter: 
Oligopoly
Vertical relations
Wholesale prices
Equilibrium mode of competition
JEL: 
D43
L13
L42
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-117-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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