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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cege Discussion Papers No. 174
Verlag: 
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege), Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper I present a simple theoretical model where firms and trade unions negotiate over wages. Firms have the possibility to offshore parts of the ir production and trade union members have a disutility from individual job loss fears. I show that higher job loss fears result in lower wages. As a Nash bargaining result, firms can use potential but non realized offshoring as a threat to enforce lower wages. Using a large German household survey, I can show evidence that increasing potential offshoring lowers wages through high job loss fears.
Schlagwörter: 
offshoring
wage bargaining
job loss fears
JEL: 
F16
J50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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