Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87711
Authors: 
Riedl, Maximilian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 174
Abstract: 
In this paper I present a simple theoretical model where firms and trade unions negotiate over wages. Firms have the possibility to offshore parts of the ir production and trade union members have a disutility from individual job loss fears. I show that higher job loss fears result in lower wages. As a Nash bargaining result, firms can use potential but non realized offshoring as a threat to enforce lower wages. Using a large German household survey, I can show evidence that increasing potential offshoring lowers wages through high job loss fears.
Subjects: 
offshoring
wage bargaining
job loss fears
JEL: 
F16
J50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
505.38 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.