Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87708 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 47
Verlag: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how institutional design in influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share guilt more easily. This facilitates becoming a supporter. Conversely, an institution requiring more supporters must rely on people who have higher individual moral standards. We analyze individual thresholds for agreeing to a transgression, depending on the available options for sharing guilt by institutional design. On the aggregate level, we study how institutions affect the likelihood of immoral outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
Moral Decision Making
Shared Guilt
Group Absolution
Diffused Responsibility
Institutional Design
Committee Decisions
Moral Transgression
JEL: 
D01
D03
D23
D63
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.37 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.