Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87569
Authors: 
van Leeuwen, Boris
Offerman, Theo
Schram, Arthur
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-112/I
Abstract: 
We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Network formation
networked public goods
peer production
social benefits
open source software
JEL: 
C91
D85
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
2.08 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.