Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/87500 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 13-101/VII
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a cost of location into Hotelling’s (1929) spatial duopoly. We derive the general conditions on the cost-of-location function under which a pure strategy price-location Nash equilibrium exists. With linear transportation cost and a suitably specified cost of location that rises toward the center of the Hotelling line, symmetric equilibrium locations are in the outer quartiles of the line, ensuring the existence of pure strategy equilibrium prices. With quadratic transportation cost and a suitably specified cost of location that falls toward the center of the line, symmetric equilibrium locations range from the center to the end of the line.
Schlagwörter: 
Horizontal product differentiation
spatial competition
cost of location
JEL: 
D21
D43
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
279.91 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.