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Autoren: 
Koudstaal, Martin
van Wijnbergen, Sweder
Datum: 
2012
Reihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-022/2/DSF31
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper deals with the relation between excessive risk taking and capital structure in banks. Examining a quarterly dataset of U.S. banks between 1993 and 2010, we find that equity is valued higher when more risky portfolios are chosen when leverage is high, and that more risk taking has a negative impact on valuation of the debt of highly leveraged banks. We find no evidence that deposit insurance is encouraging risk taking behaviour. We do find that banks with a more troubled loan portfolio take on more risk. Banks whose share price has slumped tend to gamblefor resurrection by increasing the riskiness of their asset portfolios. The results suggest that incentives embedded in the capital structure of banks contribute to systemic fragility, and so support the Basel III proposals towards less leverage and higher loss absorption capacity of capital.
Schlagwörter: 
bank fragility
risk shifting
deposit insurance
gambles for resurrection
JEL: 
G21
G28
G32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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