Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87457
Authors: 
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Fiestras-Janeiro, María Gloria
Mosquera, Manuel Alfredo
Rodríguez, Estela Sánchez-
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-012/1
Abstract: 
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
Subjects: 
Cooperative game theory
compromise admissible games
bankruptcy
core cover
complexity
JEL: 
C71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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