Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87439
Authors: 
Billand, Pascal
Bravard, Christophe
Kamphorst, Jurjen
Sarangi, Sudipta
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-019/1
Abstract: 
Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the impact such a need for confirmation has on the social networks which are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks.
Subjects: 
connections model
confirmation
two-way flow models
JEL: 
C72
D85
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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