Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87325
Authors: 
Schoenmaker, Dirk
Siegmann, Arjen
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-111/IV/DSF43
Abstract: 
Cross-border banking needs cross-border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross-border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country-specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified-majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home-country bailouts, which are very inefficient.
Subjects: 
Financial Stability
Public Good
International Monetary Arrangements
International
JEL: 
F33
G28
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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