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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 12-094/IV/DSF38
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. In addition, we find no evidence of significant wealth effects of the change in regulation. We do find that firms are increasingly letting shareholders ratify their auditors after the change in regulation, which helps in establishing a quorum.
Schlagwörter: 
Broker voting
shareholder empowerment
Securities and Exchange Commission
board effectiveness
JEL: 
G34
G38
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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