Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87298
Authors: 
Morgan, John
Sisak, Dana
Vardy, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-077/1
Abstract: 
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.
Subjects: 
career choice
promotion competition
selection
meritocracy
JEL: 
J45
J24
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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