Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87295
Authors: 
van den Brink, Rene
Chun, Youngsub
Funaki, Yukihiko
Park, Boram
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-136/II
Abstract: 
A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.
Subjects: 
TU-game
equal division solution
CIS-value
ENSC-value
population solidarity
consistency
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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