Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87247
Authors: 
Perotti, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-034/IV/DSF53
Abstract: 
This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial structure, such as the Great Reversal in the early XX century, unlike time-invariant legal institutions or cultural traits. Future research should model the sources and consequences of financial instability, and to predict how major redistributive shocks will shape regulatory choices and financial governance.
Subjects: 
political institutions
property rights
investor protection
financial development
access to finance
entry
banking
JEL: 
G21
G28
G32
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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