Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87204
Authors: 
Sharif, Zara
Swank, Otto H.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-134/VII
Abstract: 
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.
Subjects: 
information collection
communication
interest groups
decision-making
JEL: 
D72
D78
D82
H39
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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