Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87196
Authors: 
Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay
Pennings, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-010/2
Abstract: 
We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facinguncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensivedisclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that strongerantitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions aredisclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but lesssuccessful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.
Subjects: 
Antitrust
Defensive Disclosure
Patent
IBM
JEL: 
K21
L40
M10
O32
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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