Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87106
Authors: 
Bertoletti, Paolo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni di Dipartimento, EPMQ, Università degli Studi di Pavia 180
Abstract: 
We study the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information and a reserve price, and compare it with that of standard auctions. The seller should set a reserve price even when she faces incomplete information. In the latter setting, ex-ante asymmetry among bidders appears necessary to re-produce some (if any) of the interesting results derived assuming a fully-informed seller in the literature on the application of all-pay auction to lobbying games, while they appear to rely crucially on the implicit assumption of a weak (in terms of bargaining power) seller if she is fully informed.
Subjects: 
all-pay auctions
reserve price
economic theory of lobbying
JEL: 
D44
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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