Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87079
Authors: 
van den Brink, Rene
Funaki, Yukihiko
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-065/1
Abstract: 
We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player earns a fraction delta in [0,1] of the worth of that coalition without that player) earns a zero payoff. This property yields the null player property for delta = 1 and the nullifying player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions where delta is a discount factor that determines the decrease in value to be distributed in the next round after the proposal is rejected and the remaining players (without the proposer) play a new round of bidding.
Subjects: 
Cooperative TU-game
Shapley value
equal division solution
delta-discounted Shapley value
Axiomatization
Implementation
Discounting
JEL: 
C71
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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