Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87006
Authors: 
van Eijkel, Remco
Moraga, Jose Luis
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-058/1
Abstract: 
Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the incentives to sell forward for risk-hedging reasons.However, if strategic motives are also relevant, then an increase in the number of players strengthens the incentives to sell forward. This difference provides the analyst with a way to identify whether strategic considerations are important at motivating frms to sell forward. Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number of players, spot and forward sales, and churn rates, we find evidence that strategic reasons play an important role at explaining the observed firms' (inverse) hedge ratios. In addition, the data lend support to the existence of a learning effect by wholesalers.
Subjects: 
market power
risk-hedging
forward contracts
spot market
over-thecounter trade
market transparency
churn rates
JEL: 
D43
L13
G13
L95
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
565.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.