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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-037/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition, we find support for ACDC in settings where other criteria remain silent. ACDC also explains results from previous experiments.
Schlagwörter: 
cheap talk
neologism proofness
announcement proofness
credible deviation
ACDC
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D82
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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