Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86952
Authors: 
de Groot Ruiz, Adrian
Offerman, Theo
Onderstal, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-037/1
Abstract: 
Currently no refinement exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of Cheap Talk games. We propose a generalization of refinements based on credible deviations, such as neologism proofness and announcement proofness. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition, we find support for ACDC in settings where other criteria remain silent. ACDC also explains results from previous experiments.
Subjects: 
cheap talk
neologism proofness
announcement proofness
credible deviation
ACDC
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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