Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86940
Authors: 
Wagener, F.O.O.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-033/1
Abstract: 
Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the possible kinds of solutions are efficiently classified in bifurcation diagrams.
Subjects: 
Shallow lake
optimal management
dynamic games
bifurcation analysis
JEL: 
C61
C73
Q57
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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