Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86936
Authors: 
Abbring, Jaap
Chiappori, Pierre-André
Zavadil, Tibor
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 08-075/3
Abstract: 
This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives to avoid claims that are generated by the Dutch experience-rating scheme, and their effects on claim times and sizes under moral hazard. We develop tests that exploit these structural implications of moral hazard and experience rating. Unlike much of the earlier literature, we find evidence of moral hazard.
Subjects: 
insurance
moral hazard
selection
state dependence
event-history analysis
JEL: 
D82
G22
C41
C14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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