Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86931
Authors: 
Onderstal, Sander
de Meerendonk, Arthur Van
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-101/1
Abstract: 
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms this result. Moreover, we observe that the “pie” is shared the same in both auctions between buyer and suppliers both in theory and in the lab (after accounting for learning effects).
Subjects: 
Procurement
Price-only auctions
Multi-attribute auctions
Incentive Contracts
Laboratory Experiment
JEL: 
C91
D44
D86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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