Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86927
Authors: 
Houba, Harold
Motchenkova, Evgenia
Wen, Quan
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 08-120/1
Abstract: 
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.
Subjects: 
Cartel
Antitrust Policy
Antitrust Law
Antitrust regulation
Leniency program
Self-reporting
repeated game
JEL: 
L41
K21
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
339.58 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.