Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86921
Authors: 
van den Brink, René
Steffen, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 08-115/1
Abstract: 
Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organizations. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare positions of the actors. While such an analysis informs us about the authority structure within an organization, it ignores the decision-making mechanisms completely. The few studies which take into account the decision-making mechanisms make all use of adaptations of well-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organizations such as the Banzhaf measure; and thus they are all based on the structure of a simple game, i.e. they are `membership-based'. In van den Brink and Steffen (2008) it is demonstrated that such an approach is in general inappropriate for characterizing power in hierarchies as it cannot be extended to a class of decision-making mechanisms which allow certain actors to terminate a decision before all other members have been involved. As this kind of sequential decision-making mechanism turns out to be particularly relevant for hierarchies, we suggested an action-based approach - represented by an extensive game form - which can take the features of such mechanisms into account. Based on this approach we introduced a power score and power measure that can be applied to ascribe positional power to actors in sequential decision making mechanisms. In this paper we provide axiomatizations of this power score and power measure for one of the most studied decision models, namely that of binary voting.
Subjects: 
hierarchies
decision-making mechanism
power
positional power
power score
power measure
binary voting
axiomatization
JEL: 
C79
D02
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
307.87 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.