Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86903
Authors: 
Vikander, Nick
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-027/1
Abstract: 
This paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date, which will eventually cause morale to break down. The paper shows that the breakdown of morale can vary in size and the equilibrium outcomes can be Pareto ranked. A firm's measures to encourage cooperation may actually hurt morale, by convincing opportunistic team members to imitate and later take advantage of cooperative colleagues.
Subjects: 
morale
teams
cooperation
JEL: 
M50
M54
L22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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