Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86809
Authors: 
van den Brink, René
van der Laan, Gerard
Vasil'ev, Valeri
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-038/1
Abstract: 
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems, such as river games, queueing games and auction games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such 'games with ordered players' which is based on the distribution of 'dividends' taking into account the hierarchical ordering of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well-known 'Shapley value' (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally among the players in the corresponding coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this solution to river games.
Subjects: 
Totally positive TU-game
Harsanyi dividends
Core
Shapley value
Harsanyi set
Selectope
Digraph
River game
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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