Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86790
Authors: 
Houba, Harold
van der Laan, Dinard
Veldhuizen, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 08-049/1
Abstract: 
Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which motivates to study symmetric NEs: Properties and comparative statics are derived and the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin in symmetric strategies, which allows computation through a mathematical program. Simulations provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the unique limit point of the replicator dynamics.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Sealed-Bid Auction
Evolutionary Stability
Endogenous Entry
Maximin
JEL: 
D44
C72
C73
C61
L83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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