Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86783
Authors: 
Baye, Michael R.
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-066/2
Abstract: 
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision variable. These effects arise in natural interpretations of a number of important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where individuals exhibit inequality aversion or regret. We provide the closed-form solution for the symmetric Nash equilibria of this class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests.
Subjects: 
Contests
Auctions
Spillovers
JEL: 
C72
C73
D43
D44
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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