Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/86777 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 08-074/1
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small with a volatile environment where the noise is large. Subjects exert significantly more effort in the volatile environment than in the stable environment. This finding is in line with standard agency theory and contrasts a distinct element of expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation.
Schlagwörter: 
Performance measurement
noise
work motivation
experiments
agency theory
expectancy theory
JEL: 
C91
J33
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
277.9 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.