Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86756
Authors: 
Baye, Michael R.
Kovenock, Dan
de Vries, Casper G.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-090/2
Abstract: 
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the Herodotus Paradox.
Subjects: 
second price
transfer to loser
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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