Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86683
Authors: 
Vyrastekova, Jana
Onderstal, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 10-063/1
Abstract: 
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are slightly more trustworthy. However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate transfers. For a given high level of pro-social preferences, men send more than women. This may be linked to men willing to bear more risk than women.
Subjects: 
trust game
experiment
strategy method behind the veil of ignorance
gender differences
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
174.85 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.