Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86655
Authors: 
Hinloopen, Jeroen
Onderstal, Sander
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-085/1
Abstract: 
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel deterrence, cartelstability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartelformation, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces theaverage winning bid. In contrast, while a leniency program has no additional effect on cartelformation or cartel recidivism, it makes cartels more stable and reduces the winning cartel bid.
Subjects: 
Antitrust policy
Leniency Programs
English Auction
First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
Laboratory Experiments
JEL: 
C92
D44
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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