Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86652
Authors: 
Martinez, Silvia Dominguez
Swank, Otto H.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 11-034/1
Abstract: 
Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices.
Subjects: 
rules
human resource management policies
self-image
motivation
JEL: 
M5
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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